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Introduction
PREPARING this chapter was at once intimidating and challenging -in-
timidating because I have no models to draw from; and challenging because it
needed to be done. More significantly, it needed to be done by an Africanist
historian. For the days, alas, are gone when such subjects were comfortably left
to the nutty anthropologists while historians in their lonely and crusty arro-
gance, exuded effortless superiority in dusty libraries and archives in a vain
attempt to discover the &dquo;truth&dquo; about the past. &dquo;Hard history,&dquo; difficult enough
as it is, is a much more straightforward and simpler affair than the &dquo;new history&dquo;.
As our mentors were taught so did they teach us. The result is that most histori-
ans of our generation are not properly equipped with the disciplines of anthro-
pology and sociology as well as the other relevant social sciences which are
crucial to African historical reconstruction. For a good Africanist, in whatever
field, must be a jack-of-all-trades and master of one. The truth is perhaps that
few of us are really master of anything at all - whatever we may claim. It is
possible that I am really describing myself and no one else. Whatever is the
case, I must begin this chapter with an apology relative to whatever weaknesses
it may have.
At a recent international conference on the military in Africa held in
Accra, Ghana,’ a pet idea of mine received unsolicited support, namely, that
a military interpretation of African history ought, at least, to be as rewarding
as the economic or any other interpretation for that matter. This idea, however,
was clearly implied, but not theoretically focused, in the several papers pre-
sented. But it was the general consensus that in precolonial African states,
characterized, except in a very few cases, by the lack of visible armies, the
distinction between the military, economic, political, social and religious in-
stitutions of government were blurred. It follows, therefore, that the historian
1 This conference, entitled African States and the Military: Past and Present, was held under
the joint auspices of the African Studies Centre, U.C.L.A. and the University of Ghana in
August, 1975.
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who studies the African military as distinct from socio-politico-economic struc-
ture does so at his peril. And granted also that there have been discontinuities
and continuities in African institutions under both the colonial and post-
colonial epochs of African history, it follows, too, that studies of the African
military in the twentieth century ought to benefit significantly from its pre-
European antecedents. This is a point to which sociologists and political scien-
tists are only now bcginning to turn attention. Their predecessors, indeed, were
roundly accused in a perceptive, if at times contentious, contribution by Rene
Lemarchand2 at the Accra conference referred to above of being &dquo;unduly
selective in their use of history&dquo;. Their contributions, he suggests, inevitably
lack historical depth precisely because &dquo;their treatment of the African military
shows remarkable regard for historically relevant facts&dquo;. Such scholars, in short,
are wont to react like Johann von Bloch who asked with rhetorical naivery in
his The Future of War ( 1898) : &dquo;What is the use of talking about the past when
you are dealing with an altogether new set of circumstances?&dquo;3 Although his-
torians, too, have begun to make a plea for a change in this orientation towards
the study of the African military,4 they are equally accused of preoccupation
&dquo;with the unique and the specific,&dquo; of lacking a theoretical framework, and of
a tendency to let their imagination run away with them.5 There is some truth
to this accusation. It must be pointed, however, that historians are loath to
theorize without empirical data; and given the present rudimentary state of
precolonial African military studies, s their emphasis has been on the accumula-
tion of the relevant data. This is not to suggest that they are unwilling to profit
from any meaningful framework that the social scientists may provide. There is,
therefore, no serious conflict - or, at any rate, there ought not to be a serious
conflict - between historians and social scientists on this subject. Both approach-
es should complement each other. This means that a useful study of the African
military must, of necessity, be interdisciplinary and comparative. It is, of
course, true &dquo;that, as a substantive area of study, the military in Africa has been
largely preempted by sociologists and political scientists;&dquo;7 the fact remains,
nevertheless, that no discipline can effectively dominate the field. Theories
without data, and data without theories, if clothed with the garb of academic
respectability, will be a very undesirable development in African studies.
And yet the very area of data collection in the precolonial period where , in
my opinion, the historian is expected to make an important contribution, ha s
2 See "African Armies in Historical and Contemporary Perspective: The Search for Con-
nexions (sic)".
3 Cited Lemarchand, "African Armies," loc. cit.
4 See G. N. Uzoigwe, Revolution and Revolt in Bunyoro Kitara: Two Studies (Longman: 1970),
pp. 1-29; idem, "Precolonial Military Studies in Africa", The Journal of Modern African
Studies, 13, 3 (1975), pp. 469-481; cf. B. A. Ogot (ed.), War and Society in Africa: Ten
Studies (London, 1972).
5 Lemarchand, "African Armies", loc. cit.
6 Uzoigwe, "Precolonial Military Studies in Africa", loc. cit.
7 Lemarchand, "African Armies", loc. cit.
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presented him with immense problems. It is, therefore, easy to understand why
historians, for so long, have deliberately avoided the study of this sub-field of the
historical discipline. To begin with, that the societies with which they are con-
cerned kept no written records of their military establishments or of their mili-
tary achievements made the task almost an impossible one especially during the
era when oral tradition was not taken seriously by classical historians. With the
acceptance of oral tradition - scientifically collected and applied - as a legiti-
mate concern of historical writing, the problem has abated somewhat. We
know, however, that oral tradition is most unreliable when dealing with the
military exploits or martial spirit of a given society. And yet, if the military has
been studied as socio-political structure, the problem would have been no more
difficult than the general problems of precolonial African history.
In this study of the warrior and the state in Africa, I have relied on first,
oral tradition. It must be kept constantly in mind that most of these sources are
&dquo;,fi-ee texts&dquo; with an overlay of nationalistic jingoism and a tintinnabulation of
moral righteousness.g Second, travel lore. These comprise the published works
of nineteenth century European travellers, traders, explorers, missionaries and
administrators. These sources, too, are based, in large part, on oral testimonies
and should, consequently, be used with care. Third, ethnographic data. These
are also based on oral tradition, oral testimonies, and sometimes on personal
observation. They are variably informed but sketchy. And fourth, published and
unpublished materials on precolonial African military history including my own
previous studies. It is hoped that a judicious use of these studies might enable
us to gain some insight into the relationship between the warrior and the state
in precolonial Africa, and perhaps help to put the &dquo;myths&dquo; which we love so
much and for which we have been for long maligned in historical perspective.
Given these sources, there are, of course, several ways of approaching the
relationship between the African warrior and the state as a unit of analysis. I
have opted for the structural-functional analysis as the most meaningful ap-
proach. This is in keeping with my conviction that the military must be studied
and comprehended as socio-political structure. I am not, therefore, concerned
with the impressions or images of warriors. Most societies - indeed all societies -
have concepts of masculinity, bravery, love of country, love of honour, and
martial spirit. But there is no society which is either totally pacifist or totally
aggressive. I am suggesting that war, or the use of naked force to achieve de-
sired goals, has proved to be a permanent feature of human society. It is as
old as the world and, therefore, older than history. The warrior, the fighting
8 The major traditions I consulted include John W. Nyakatura, Anatomy of an African
Kingdom : A History of Bunyoro Kitara (New York: 1973), ed. G. N. Uzoigwe; Kabalega and
Winyi, "The Kings of Bunyoro-Kitara" in three parts, Uganda Journal, 3 (1935), pp. 155-
160 ; 4 (1936), pp. 75-83; 5 (1937), pp. 53-68; A. B. (Ruth) Fisher, Twilight Tales of the
Black Baganda (London: 1911, 2nd ed. 1970), pp. 69-178; Apolo Kaggwa, The Kings of
Buganda (Nairobi: 1971), ed. M. S. M. Kiwanuka; A. T. Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand
and Natal (London : 1938); Samuel Johnson, The History of the &Upsi;orubas (London : 1921 ;
reprinted 1969).
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man, the man of action, is always the executor of violence but not necessarily
always its originator. He is, in the context of the state, the instrument of political
action. Wars are never fought for illusory ends. States fight for a variety of
reasons: survival, power, wealth, prestige, sex and so forth. In precolonial
African states, therefore, where the state and the military were fused, the study
of the warrior is, in essence, the study of the state. But yet not everyone, strictly
speaking, was a warrior. This study, therefore, is concerned with the very diffi-
cult task of (a) isolating those aspects of precolonial African state organisation
that have a discernible military function; (b) of identifying the function of the
warrior in that context; and (c) of comparing this structural-functional aspect
of the warrior in several African state systems.
The Warrior as a Political Animal
In no state, traditional or modern, is the military totally divorced from the
political structure. The degree of integration, however, between the military
and politics varies from state to state. It follows, therefore, that the warrior
tradition, in the sense I conceive it, cannot be uniform. But this is not to suggest
that dramatic differences necessarily existed. The warrior, in a traditional
society, was a political animal, more so than the rank and file of the citizenry.
He saw politics as state power; he knew that the art of politics concerns how to
acquire that power, how to wield it effectively, and how to preserve it. Most
importantly, he knew that the surest means of achieving state power is through
the agency of the warrior. Since a considerable number of precolonial African
states were conquest states, the integration of the military and politics, as well
as the invocation of warrior values in these states, was carefully cultivated along
with the construction of historic - invariably mythical - charters with an overlay
of the divine right of rulers in order to ensure the survival and viability of these
states. Even among non-conquest, invariably non-kingdom, states, the function
of the warrior was, indeed, assured. We shall examine the theme of the warrior
in politics under the following sub-categories: the relationship between the ruler
and the warrior class; the function of the warrior in territotial administration;
and the impact of the rise of the professional warrior on the primordial state.
We shall draw our illustrations primarily from the Zulu, Bunyoro Kitara and
Buganda, Oyo and the Yoruba states, and Kikuyu, indicating differences and
similarities where appropriate.
The political organisation of the Zulu before 1800 did not differ markedly
from those of small scale, precolonial African societies which evolved a chiefly
system of government. Warfare appears to have been rare, and when it did
occur, it was usually a struggle for power between a chief and his relatives.9 The
9 E. A. Ritter, Shaka Zulu: The Rise of the Zulu Empire (London, 1955: reprinted New York
1973), pp. 22-23; Max Gluckman, "The Kingdom of the Zulu of South Africa" in
M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.), African Political Systems (New York: 1940),
p. 25; M. Gluckman, "The Individual in a Social Framework: The Rise of King Shaka
of Zululand," Journal of African Studies, 1, 2 (1974), pp. 124-125.
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civil war in Zululand between 1808 and 1818 significantly changed the situa-
tion. For one thing, it brought about enlargement of political scale; for another
it began a tradition of militarism among the Zulu which exists to the present
day. Shaka’s much vaunted revolution is, in fact, not as original as his numer-
ous admirers like to suggest. It has, indeed, been noted that &dquo;he duplicated in
his great new nation early Nguni tribal organization, though on a much larger
scale and with a deeper hierarchy of officials.&dquo;1° The political organisation of
the pre-Shaka Nguni state, like those of the other southern Bantu states, was
headed by a hereditary chief, assisted by sub-chiefs - usually members of the
royal family - who administered the districts as well as by other officials called
indunas. The senior indunas had also the rank of deputy chief. The indunas were
powerful officials and were not chosen from among the ranks of the royal eligi-
bles to the throne. The chief and his officials were commanders of their people
in war and political leaders in war and peace. A chief was usually a great
warrior, and his officials were appointed, in large measure, as a result of their
military valour. In the pre-~IIfecane Zulu state, therefore, the military and
politics were dangerously fused. The ordinary citizens had no means of re-
moving an unpopular government. Of course, a &dquo;palace revolt&dquo; sometimes oc-
curred, but the system of government did not change. This is very reminiscent
of contemporary military-cum civil dictatorships in Africa.
The interlacustrine states of Bunyoro Kitara (popularly known as Bunyoro)
and Buganda have also a long tradition of the warrior in politics. In the first
instance, both are, according to their traditions, conquest states. In the process
of consolidating their hold on the newly acquired territories, the Omukama of
Bunyoro and the Kabaka of Buganda had no choice but to invoke warrior values
and construct historic charters in the process of legitimacy engineering. As the
last Kabaka of Buganda, the late Sir Edward Muteesa, put it with respect to
Buganda: &dquo;The word Kabaka means &dquo;emissary&dquo;, and some time in the past an
overseer sent from Bunyoro had set himself up as an independent ruler. For a
long time we struggled for survival, surrounded by larger neighbours, existing
like a garrison state; and herein lay our strength.&dquo;11 In Bunyoro, too, the word
&dquo;Kitara means a sword but has historically come to signify an empire worn by
the sword by individuals possessed of excessive virtue.&dquo;12
At this early stage, the ideal king was the great warrior, larger than life.
The military activities - or supposed military activities - of these kingdoms are
eloquently recorded in the traditions. The dominant picture that has emerged
from these sources is that the political history of the interlacustrine states of
east Africa is, in large measure, a study of the Abachwezi Kitara empire and
the struggle for mastery following its collapse between Bunyoro and Buganda.
It is understandable, therefore, why in states such as these the military was
10 Gluckman, "Individual in a Social Framework," p. 134.
11 Sir Edward Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom (London: 1967), p. 30.
12 G. N. Uzoigwe, "Bunyoro Kitara in the North Interlacustrine Region," in S. Kiwanuka
and A. Temu (eds.), East African Kingdoms (forthcoming).
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destined to play a crucial role. But like the Nguni state, too, the military was
not distinct from the political structure: it followed closely the organisation of
the state. There was, constitutionally (in either kingdom), a monocephalous
kingship which, as both a centrifugal and centripetal force, was at the apex of
the political order. Authority flowed from the king to the abakungu (territorial
administrators). These abakungu were assisted by a hierarchy of deputies who,
together with their immediate overlords, were expected to provide warriors for
their king’s wars. Traditionally, the abakunguship was not necessarily heredi-
tary. Such an appointment was usually a reward for military valour. Bunyoro
tradition, indeed, maintains that originally only outstanding warriors were
made abakunga.13 Neither in Bunyoro nor in Buganda was a cowardly chief
likely to retain his position for long. Although in Buganda the danger of a
successful omukungu (singular of abakungu)-cum-general overthrowing the
Kabaka was unthinkable since he was neither a prince nor a royal eligible, yet
the possibility remained that he could be wooed by a royal pretender to the
throne to help him overthrow the incumbent Kabaka. Therefore, before a
commanding general left for the battlefield, he was expected to leave behind
with the Kabaka a precious hostage.14 In Bunyoro, on the other hand, where
the danger of secession was ever present especially as a considerable number of
the most important abakungu belonged to the royal family, the Omukama took
steps to ensure that his omukungu-cum-general would not be contumacious, or
more seriously, seditious.15 The history of Bunyoro is full of examples which
illustrate that he did not always succeed. It was, however, during succession
and civil wars16 that these civil-military administrators exerted the decisive
political impact.
In a general sense, the political organisation of the Yoruba state systems
resembled that of the Kitara empire. There is the Alafin of Oyo who was re-
garded as &dquo;the supreme head of all the kings and princes of the Yoruba
nation&dquo; 1 ~ who traces his descent to Oranyan, the supposed founder of the old
Oyo empire. At the height of Oyo power these kings and princes are estimated
to have numbered 1060. But according to Johnson, however, &dquo;The word
‘king&dquo;’ included &dquo;all more or less distinguished chiefs, who stand at the head
of a clan, or one who is the ruler of an important district or province, especially
those who can trace their descent from the founder, or from one of the great
13 Uzoigwe, Revolution and Revolt, p. 1.
14 John Roscoe, The Baganda (London: 1911; 2nd ed., 1965), p. 350.
15 John Roscoe, The Banyoro or Bakitara (Cambridge: 1923), p. 52; John Beattie, The Nyoro
State (Oxford: 1971), pp. 137-138; 4. idem, Bunyoro: An African Kingdom (New York: 1960),
p. 36.
16 For succession and civil wars in Bunyoro and Buganda see G. N. Uzoigwe, "Succession
and Civil War in Bunyoro Kitara," The International Journal of African Historical Studies,
VI, 1 (1973), pp. 49-71; Martin Southwald, "The History of a History: Royal Succession
in Buganda," in I. M. Lewis (ed.), History and Social Anthropology (London and New York:
1968), pp. 127-151.
17 Johnson, History of the &Upsi;oruba, p. 41.
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leaders or hereos who settled with him in this country.&dquo; They all owed alle-
giance &dquo;to the Alafin or king of the Yorubas.&dquo;18 In the context of the Kitara
empire, therefore, most of the abakunga would qualify as kings in the Yoruba
usage; and the position of the Alafin resembles that of the Omukama of
Bunyoro.
Apparently, before Oranyan who has been described as &dquo;primarily a polit-
ical adventurer,&dquo; 19 the Yoruba had no common political head. It was Orany-
an, also reputed as &dquo;a very brave and warlike prince&dquo; who, after the foundation
of Oyo, had set in motion the political federation of a congeries of chiefdoms
and principalities which appear to have exhibited a remarkable cultural homo-
geneity. He is said to have started his campaign with a bodyguard of &dquo;150 well-
trained soldicrs.&dquo;~° The Oyo empire, therefore, like those of Bunyoro, Buganda,
and Zulu was also a conquest state from whose inception the military played a
crucial role. The warrior ideal was relentlessly cultivated. The Alafins, like the
earlier Abakama of Bunyoro, were required to be great warriors and to exhibit
militant leadership as well. Alafin Ajaka, for example, was deposed by the
Oyo Mesi (Council of State) for his lack of militarism and replaced by Sango,
Oranyan’s son, who was known to have demonstrated warlike characteristics.
It is interesting to note that when Sango died prematurely and Ajaka was given
a second chance, he proved to be more warlike than his predecessors. Oyo be-
came the terror of its neighbours as it established overlordship over the other
Yoruba state systems. The relaxation of the warrior tradition in subsequent
reigns led to the defeat of Oyo by Nupe. The reigning Alafin, Onigbogi, fled to
exile. The exile of the Alafins lasted for 75 years. While in exile, the Alafins of
Oyo revived their warrior tradition, restoring eventually the military might of
Oyo and reoccupying Old Oyo around A.D. 1610.~1
To ensure that the disaster which occurred in the reign of Onigbogi was
not repeated, the Alafins of Oyo began a policy of military reorganisation and
militant expansion of Oyo influence. Conquered areas were placed under the
effective administration of the Ajele (political residents). It was during this
period that Alafin Ajagbo created the position of Are Ona Kakanfo (Generalis-
simo of Oyo’s army) . The Kakanfo (as he is popularly known) was expected to
wage war regularly, to win each war &dquo;within three months or be brought home
dead.&dquo;22 By mid-eighteenth century Oyo had become the largest state system
in Yorubaland. It had also become a military machine which, if not properly
controlled, could prove dangerous for political stability.
Constitutionally, Oyo was a semi-divine monarchy ruled by an Alafin whose
18 Idem.
19 See J. A. Atanda, "The Military in the Politics of the Old Oyo Empire," paper presented
at the Accra Conference, August 1975; cf. Johnson, History of the Yorubas, pp. 143-148 for
Oranyan’s career.
20 Ibid.
21 R. S. Smith, "The Alafin in Exile: A Study of the Igboho Period in Oyo History,"
Journal of African History, VI ,1 (1965), pp. 57-77.
22 Atanda, "The Military in Politics," loc. cit.
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power, in theory, was absolute; in practice, however, his authority was subject
to checks and balances by the Oyo Mesi. Unlike his eastern and southern
African counterparts, the Alafin was obliged to carry out the decisions of the
Oyo Mesi or commit suicide. The Bashorun, as leader of the Oyo ~Iesi, was a
very powerful person but he did not exercise absolute power either. Nor did the
great Ogboni chiefs whose head was called Oluwo. The Oluwo checked the
ambitions of the Bashorun who, in turn, checked the ambitions of the Alafin.
And none of these three powerful leaders had individual control over the
Kakanfo and his corps of 70 standing army officers called the Esos. But the
Kakanfo, too, was forbidden to live within the capital. The idea was to cut him
off from possible dangerous influence over the Esos who lived there. The Esos
were distributed equally (ten each) among the seven members of the Oyo Mess
and put under their control. No single individual, therefore, could use the army
to achieve his objectives. The Oyo Mesi, by having corporate control of the
army, could also check the ambitions of the Oluwo and his Ogboni.
This complex and delicate political balance was upset when a change in the
succession to the throne increased the powers of the Bashorun at the expense of
those in charge of the other arms of government. It is said that during the third
quarter of the eighteenth century Bashorun Gaha, using his new powers, was
able to set up five Alafins, four of whom he destroyed. Having subverted the
constitution, he ruled despotically for 20 years but somehow he could not gain
exclusive control of the military. His power collapsed when an apparently
puppet Alafin called Abiodun secretly plotted with the Kakanfo and the pro-
vincial chiefs to bring about his overthrow. The constitution was, therefore,
restored by military intervention and Gaha was burnt at the stake. Coup
d’etats always tend to be a way of life once introduced into the political system.
Oyo was no exception. It was the coup led by Kakanfo Afonja which set in
motion the trend of events which eventually led to the total destruction of the
Oyo empire in 1837.23 It is ironic that the political system which took very
carefully calculated measures to avoid a coup eventually fell by it.
The army, then, was a very important instrument in the rise and fall of
the Oyo empire. But Oyo was not a military state. The 70 Esos divided into
seven equal parts did not constitute much of an army. The military and politics
were still dangerously fused and the ordinary citizens were ready pawns in
whatever power politics their leaders might choose to initiate. Little is known
about the military in the other Yoruba states which numbered 39 by the nine-
teenth century. We know, however, that the Elegbe (military chiefs) of eastern
Yoruba formed a distinct category from the civilian chiefs, that their influence
was minimal during peacetime, and that they posed no threat to constitutional,
political authority.24
23 Ibid; Johnson, History of the &Upsi;orubas; J. B. Webster and A. A. Boahen, The Revolutionary
Years: West Africa Since 1800 (London: 1967), pp. 92-95.
24 S. A. Akitoye, "The Military Among the Yoruba of South-Western Nigeria in the Nine-
teenth Century," paper presented at the Accra Conference, 5 August, 1975.
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According to the mythical constitution of the Kikuyu - which abolished
&dquo;the status of a king or nobleman&dquo; - government was the responsibility of the
Y’iama (councils of elders). The Kiama were all retired warriors. The military,
then, was a training ground for political offices. The Anake or war rior class con-
sisted of young men between the ages of eighteen and forty. This very important
class formed the nj’al?7a_))a ita (council of war) which, in addition to &dquo;its military
activities, represented the interests of the young people in the government.&dquo;25
The Kikuyu system of government as well as its military organisation was more
democratic than the others we have discussed so far. Kikuyuland was a non-
kingdom state in which the warrior was a political animal par excellence. From
his early years, a youth knew that to reach the coveted position of membership
of the Kiiama - and more importantly to be able to influence its deliberations -
he must strive to achieve reputation as a great warrior. The warrior tradition,
therefore, as a way of life, was institutionalized. In such a system, the military
overthrow of the government did not make sense and apparently was never
attempted. The Kiama was continuously changing as a result of new additions
through the age-grade system or as a result of the death of some of the existing
members.
The African warriors were, therefore, from the examples we have seen, an
indivisible element of the central government. But since they were also military
leaders as well as administrators, they played crucial roles in territorial adminis-
tration. In the kingdom states, it was the duty of the civil-military administra-
tors of provinces to provide soldiers for their king’s wars while the king under-
took to protect them and their provinces from both internal and external attack.
The king was their commander-in-chief; they were the king’s generals; and
their deputies could be ranked in descending order from what might be the
equivalent today of brigadiers to lieutenants. The rest of the population com-
prised the citizen militia; the so-called invisible armies. Failure to support their
king during a military emergency constituted a rebellion. Such a rebellion
might succeed or collapse depending on the alignment of political forces in the
country. Sometimes a successful rebellion resulted in secession and the founda-
tion of a new kingdom especially if the rebellions commander was a prince and
a royal eligible.
This was particularly true of Bunyoro where the defence of the kingdom
was the responsibility of the obwesengeze26 (territorial armies) which were under
the direct command of their civil-military administrators. They were, in es-
sence, private companies who owed nominal allegiance to the Omukama
through these territorial administrators. The Omukama, too, had his own
private companies, or palace guards, but they were not strong enough to de-
termine the outcome even of internal conflicts. In such a situation his terri-
25 Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya (London: 1938; N. York: 1965), p. 187.
26 Obwesengenze is a Luganda word. The Banyoro used it to denote personal possession with
all rights of disposal. The Runyoro equivalent is abahinya. My Banyoro informants,
however, seem to prefer the Luganda variety. In the context in which it is used in this essay,
the territorial armies were considered to be the personal possession of the military chiefs.
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torial administrators, who behaved as kings, except in name, were potentially
dangerous. In any political structure, then, where the civil-military administra-
tors of provinces form the basis of military organisation, the position of the
central government was bound to be weak. This was the dilemma of the Bunyo-
ro kingdom prior to the rise of Kabalega. 21 In Buganda, too, the territorial
administrators, like their compatriots in Bunyoro, by being civil-military
leaders, exercised tremendous impact on historical movements in their king-
dom. Admittedly, they were not royal eligibles but they could combine, under
the umbrella of a royal eligible, to depose a ruling Kabaka; admittedly, too, the
position of the later Kabakas was, at any rate, in practical terms, stronger than
that of the later Abakama of Bunyoro with the exception of Kabalega. Never-
theless, the Buganda territorial rulers were also the accredited defenders of their
kingdom and literally owned all the individuals living within their territorial
limits.28 In either kingdom it was the mystique of kingship and the monarch’s
ability to manipulate different interest groups - and not the actual military
force wielded by him - which ensured stability. The source of military strength
of a civil-military administrator was ultimately all the able-bodied citizens who
constituted the fighting force. In wartime, they fought under his banner; in
peacetime, they belonged to him, although, in theory, everybody belonged to
the king. They were by no means serfs since they did not cultivate the fields for
their lords. Cultivation, generally, was done by women. The male citizens con-
stituted, rather, a militia who served directly the ambitions of their civil-military
overlord. The function of the warrior in territorial governance in Zululand and
Yorubaland prior to the nineteenth century did not differ dramatically from
that obtained in Bunyoro and Buganda and should not, therefore, detain us.29
Among the Kikuyu, on the other hand, the variation is worth emphasizing. The
anake (warrior class) was divided into senior warriors and junior warriors.
Kenyatta describes their governmental function thus:
Each group had its village, district and national leaders (athamaki a riika), who acted as
spokesmen in all matters concerning the welfare of the groups and the tribe. These leaders
were chosen by their particular groups at general or public assembly. They were men
who had proved by their own actions, their capability of leadership; had shown bravery
in wars, impartiality in justice, self-sacrifice, and above all, discipline in the group. A
man with these qualities was able to attain a high position and esteem in the community,
especially when he had retired from the activities of a warrior. Judges and responsible
elders... were chosen from such men.30
27 See G. N. Uzoigwe, "Kabalega and the Making of a New Kitara," Tarikh, 3, 2 (1970),
pp. 5-20; cf. reprint of same in Obaro Ikime (ed.), Leadership in 19th Century Africa (London :
1974) pp. 000.
28 C. C. Wrigley, "The Changing Economic Structure of Buganda," in L. A. Fallers (ed.),
The King’s Men (London: 1964), pp. 21-22.
29 Those interested in pursuing the subject further should consult for Zululand Gluckman,
"The Kingdom of the Zulu," loc. cit. ; idem, "The Individual in a Social Framework,"
loc. cit. ; Ritter, Shaka Zulu, op. cit. ; Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand, op. cit. And for Yoru-
baland, Johnson, History of the Yoruba, op, cit. ; Atanda, "The Military in Politics," loc. cit. ;
R. S. Smith, Kingdoms of the &Upsi;oruba (London : 1969).
30 Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, p. 192.
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What emerges from the Kikuyu system as described by Kenyatta is a gov-
ernment founded on the principle of division of functions with harmony,
stability, respect, age, and lack of individualism as its most cherished character-
istics. Underspinning all these characteristics was the ideology of the warrior
as the bedrock of statehood.
The Kikuyu system did not change until the advent of British rule. Within
the kingdom states we have discussed so far, however, tremendous changes oc-
curred during the nineteenth century, a century characterized by revolutions,
transition, and change. One of the revolutions pertained to the military; and
the basic military revolution was the rise of professional and standing armies.
Hitherto, such armies were rare in Africa. The new armies challenged estab-
lished authority or restored it as the case might be, subverted the constitution
or ignored it, enlarged tlie political scale or decreased it, and brought about
stability or created instability. And to add to the revolutionary situations that
existed, the new-style warriors came increasingly to employ the use of firearms.
Among these developments the bantu revolution in southern Africa is the
most celebrated by historians. The Zulu empire of Shaka which his successors -
Dingaane, l~Ipande, Cetewayo, and Dinuzulu - somehow managed to lose, is a
good example of a conquest state in which this new-style warrior was dominant
and which institutionalized and invoked both the reality and myth of warrior
values. 1B1&dquo;e have already noted that Shaka improved and enlarged what hc
inherited without necessarily destroying the basic organisation of society.
&dquo;Dingiswayo&dquo;, indeed, &dquo;played Philip to Shaka’s Alexander&dquo; as Ritter sug-
gests,31 but Shaka militarized the politics of the state more than any leader in
Africa before him. The Zulu state was now organised along military lines; the
king depended almost entirely on the military indunas who, in turn, depended
on their zmpis. Those warriors, together with their commanders, were grouped
by age, quartered in barracks, and forbidden to marry before they retired from
the military. Their influence was such that the old aristocracy of chiefly indunas,
by now means abolished, quickly became a cypher in politics. It is doubtful,
however, that in the post-Shaka era there was a chiefly induna who was not a
retired warrior, very much in the Kikuyu tradition. The Zulu king, himself a
respectable military leader, remained, nevertheless - much in the tradition of
contemporary military dictatorships in Africa - both a centrifugal and a centri-
petal force in the state. In legal theory he owned all the land and exercised un-
restrained sovereignty over all his people. His official title of Nkosi was also the
official name of the National Parliament or the Royal Assembly just as in
Bunyoro the name Obukama means kingship or the state and the name Omu-
kama means the king. In practice, however, this sovereignty was subjected to
various and subtle checks and balances prescribed by custom and dictated by
political realities. Not even the great Shaka - before he became practically in-
sane with power or grief or both - could afford to act outside of the law. And
when he did so, he paid with his life.
31 Ritter, Shaka Zulu, p. 41.
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The survival of the Zulu state therefore as well as the survival of the king
himself depended on the alliance between the king, the standing army of war-
riors, and the chiefly indunas. In this alliance the warrior was dominant. Shaka
knew, in his years of sobriety, that without his warriors he was nothing. That
was why he spared no efforts to please them. And to ensure that the elite among
his warriors did not become overmighty subjects - as Mzilikazi Kumalo at-
tempted to be afterwards - he militarized the entire population including all
traditional ceremonies. The idea of individuals living in military barracks, built
like ordinary Zulu homesteads but containing thousands of men under arms
was mind-boggling at the time. These barracks were, in addition, regarded as
royal homesteads. The age-regimental system, introduced by Dingiswayo, but
perfected by Shaka, was used to ensure the total submission of the people to
military authority.32 A new regiment was created each year as the occasion
arose until Zululand became a military camp; and politics became, not the
art of the possible, but the art of the strongest.
The strongest was the warrior; and the king and commander-.n-chief was
the strongest and bravest warrior of them all. He punished and pampered his
warriors - as the occasion demanded - with equal exuberance. &dquo;The secret of
Shaka’s &dquo;popularity&dquo;, Ritter has noted, &dquo;was his great liberality to his soldiers
at the expense of his tributary chiefs and the personal attention he gave to the
needs of his warriors.&dquo; And &dquo;like his contemporary, Napoleon, who told his
soldiers that they each carried a Field ll~Iarshall’s baton in their knapsacks,
Shaka let his warriors know that there was no limit to their promotion, irrespec-
tive of their clan or social status, provided only that they had proved their
merit.&dquo;33 Shaka, however, did not tolerate civil jurisdiction over the army; the
responsibility of dealing with his warriors was his alone.3-~ The Zulu state re-
sembled the timarchic state of Sparta although Spartan warriors were allowed
to marry. &dquo;A man,&dquo; writes Gluckman, &dquo;was called isihlangu senkesi (war-shield
of the king). The dominant values of Zulu life were those of the warrior and they
were satisfied in service at the king’s barracks and his wars.&dquo;35 Nothing else,
apparently, seems to have mattered.
The repercussions of Zulu militarism in Bantu Africa were enormous.
Warrior institutions and values a la Shaka spread like wildfire throughout south
32 Perhaps it is worth pointing out at this point that at the Accra Conference referred to
above, one of the suggestions (relative to the best means of putting a stop to the epidemic
of military coups in Africa) which produced the most hilarious reception was the abolition
of the present structure of the African military and the compulsory arming of every
citizen. It was felt that Africans everywhere are being totally submitted to military
authority.
33 Ritter, Shaka Zulu, pp. 99-100.
34 Ibid., p. 270.
35 Gluckman, "The Kingdom of the Zulu," p. 31. It is interesting to note that as early as
1918 W. S. Fergusson compared the Zulu and Spartan military system. See Fergusson,
The Zulus and the Spartans: A Comparison of Their Military Systems (Cambridge, Mass.:
1918).
32
central and east central Africa. These institutions and values were modified to
suit differing situational factors. And warrior values, at any rate, persist to the
present day within, of course, the limitations imposed by harsh, European
minority overlordship. It has also been pointed out that during the &dquo;early
colonial period the tradition of the Wfecane ... played an important part in
determining psychological attitudes to white rule.&dquo;36 For example, the Ndebele
revolts in Southern Rhodesia (1896-1897), the revolt of the Zulu against white
rule (1906), the Maji Maji revolt against the Germans in which the Ngoni (who
inrupted into East Africa under the leadership of Zwangendaba during the
Mfecane) played an active part, were all influenced, in large part, by the
traditions of the Mfecane. So also were the millenarian and nationalist libera-
tion movements in southern Africa.37 The Ndebele and the Ngoni regard the
nineteenth century as a golden age in their history destroyed by the imposition
of European rule.
The rise of a professional warrior class in Bunyoro and Buganda during the
second half of the nineteenth century proved momentous in the history of both
kingdoms. The creation of the abarusura (national standing army) by Omukama
Chwa II Kabalega of Bunyoro was a direct challenge to the military power of
the civil-military administrators. It denuded the territorial obwesengeze of able
and ambitious young men, anxious to improve their lot, who enlisted in the
national army to serve their king, enrich themselves, and help to defend their
country. Whether Kabalega knew it or not, and whether the civil-military ad-
ministrators realized it or not, the creation of the abarusura was constitutionally
fundamental for it amounted to a drastic change in power relations in Bunyoro.
The professional warrior, not the good old warrior-politician, had now become
the backbone of the new power in the land. And he was used by Kabalega to
ensure the ascendancy of royal, over aristocratic, power. The territorial ad-
ministrators remained, nevertheless, a relic of the old political order, perform-
ing now the dreary functions of collecting the king’s taxes and settling disputes.
They also still retained their military obwesengeze who acted as reserve warriors
to be called up by the king during an emergency. The abarusura, on the other
hand, were precluded from exercising, at any rate, direct political power. Never-
theless, under Kabalega, Bunyoro was an armed camp. The military, without
having a clear political role, was nevertheless dominant in politics.38 The
soldiers threw their weight about and quickly gained a bad reputation.39
Gaetano Casati, who was a prisoner of the abarusura recorded : &dquo;... the power
of the banassura (sic) in the government was assured. The owners of the land
were deprived of every customary right ... the military party became pre-
ponderant in Unyoro ... (and even) the supervision of government councils
36 J. D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Bantu Africa
(London: 1966), p. 181.
37 Ibid., p. 181; cf. B. G. M. Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa (London : 1961); E. Roux,
Time Longer than Rope (London: 1964).
38 Uzoigwe, Revolution and Revolt, pt. 1.
39 Ibid., pp. 13-16.
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and administration of justice were given up to military influence.&dquo;40 Kabalega
had deliberately set his territorial administrators and his new style generals
against themselves. But he balanced the forces in such a way that the adminis-
trators still exercised considerable authority, if not effective power, since real
power was bound to lie with the sword. And the sword, at this time, was
strengthened by the addition of firearms.
In Buganda, Kabaka Mwanga created his version of the abarusura which has
been described as &dquo;a new corps d’elite of fusiliers, who decided the issue of
battles.&dquo;41 They differed from the abarusura in the sense that they combined the
functions of the old provincial administrators as well as those of professional
warriors. The difference, really, between the old and the new was not only in
the locus of power but also in the class of the &dquo;new men&dquo; who led these forces
and who by the last two decades of the nineteenth century wielded enormous
influence in Kiganda politics even at the expense of the Kabaka himself. They
began their career as young men most of whom had been educated as pages in
the Kabaka’s court where they had adhered to either Islam or Christianity de-
pending on the predilection of the Kabaka at that time. It was Kabaka
Mwanga who formed them into new regiments after the persecution of the
Christians in 1886 as a counterweight to what he considered to be the reaction-
ary forces of the old territorial rulers. Without destroying the ancient and well-
tested mechanism of territorial administration, Mwanga simply removed from
the old civil-military barons of the kingdom the military power which was the
source of their enormous influence. Unlike Kabalega, however, Mwanga was
unable to manage the monster he had created and quickly fell prey to it.42
As a result of the nineteenth century civil war in Yorubaland, the military
assumed unbridled influence in politics. The new warlords who rose to in-
fluence in this period used their private armies to reduce the traditional rulers
as their puppets. The new-style warlords, quite different from the traditional
Elegbe (warrior-chiefs), were usually young and ambitious men anxious to make
a name for themselves in what they perceived to have been a new heroic age
in Yoruba history in which heroism and military adventurism assured not only
survival but also glory, honour, and wealth. They still recognised, however, the
nominal sovereignty of their respective Obas; sometimes they gave them part
of their booty; and in many cases their armies were used to defend or expand
their Obas’ territories.43 But yet, like the abarusura of Bunyoro, the &dquo;new men&dquo; -
the warlords - constituted a departure from customary practice as well as a
40 Gaetano Casati, Ten Years in Equatoria (London : 1898), pp. 272-274.
41 Wrigley, "Changing Economic Structure of Buganda," p. 25.
42 This episode of Buganda’s history ought to be well known by now. The most relevant
works for our purposes, however, include J. A. Rowe, "The Baganda Revolutionaries,"
Tarikh 3, 2 (1970), pp. 34-35; D. A. Low, Buganda in Modern History (London: 1971),
pp. 13-54; Michael Wright, Buganda in the Heroic Age (New York: 1971).
43 Akintoye, "Military Among the Yoruba," loc. cit. ; idem, Revolution and Power Politics in
&Upsi;orubaland (London: 1971); Smith, Kingdoms of the &Upsi;oruba, pp. 120-129, 155-174;
J. F. A. Ajayi and R. S. Smith, Yoruba Warfare in the 19th Century (Cambridge: 1964).
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challenge to the leadership role of the territorial administrators. But, unlike the
abarusura, they were not a creation of the Obas. Their success in this confronta-
tion was due to their possession of personal standing armies armed with fire-
arms as well as with traditional weapons. The rise of the warlords, it has been
argued, resulted in the loss of personal freedoms among ordinary citizens who,
in search of security following the breakdown of law and order, sought the pro-
tection of powerful leaders who maintained their positions by force.44 With the
advent of British rule ended the era of the great warlords in Yoruba history.
To summarize our sampling so far: the African warrior was a political
animal more than the rest of the citizenry especially as the military and the
state were dangerously fused; that the study of the warrior is tantamount, in
fact, to the study of the state; that in the study of the state, the political func-
tion of the warrior was dominant in both national and territorial administra-
tions ; and that the rise of standing armies or professional warriors tended to
upset the political balance. In the case of the Yoruba and Buganda, both the
king and the old civil-military administrators became subjected to domination
by their warriors; in Bunyoro and Zulu, on the other hand, only the old civil-
military administrators of territories were reduced to a political cypher. There
was an alliance between the military and the monarchy which gave rise to
centralisation and stability. In all these developments, politics was so structured
that the people could not change an oppressive government. Governments were
of course overthrown, but these were usually &dquo;palace revolts&dquo; in which the
position of the ordinary citizens did not change markedly. Politics among the
Kikuyu was apparently more democratic than in the other samples. There was
no king; there was no nobleman; there was neither a standing army nor pro-
fessional warriors as such; and the individual citizen was an indivisible element
of the government. Although our samples are understandably limited - but
nevertheless carefully chosen - we may hazard the conclusion that the function
of the warrior in precolonial Africa exhibited more similarities than dissimi-
larities.
The Warrior in a Socio-cultural Framework
The warrior tradition manifested itself also in a variety of interlocking
socio-cultural and economic relationships within the social organisation of the
state. The individual warrior, it must be understood, was, first and last, a
citizen. He was therefore only significant in the context of the larger society. In
short, he was subject to social manipulation by the state in the interests of
statal stability and survival. This manipulation attempted to achieve several
ends, the most important of which, at any rate, for our immediate purposes,
included (a) the inculcation of the idea of a joint identity, common heritage,
and common future (nationalism, patriotism) ; (b) the achievement of corporate
alliances and other social arrangements (social transformation); and (c) educa-
44 Akintoye, "Military Among the Yoruba," cf. also Smith and Alayi in f.n. 43.
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tion with respect to guides and sanctions of a nationally or culturally accepted
moral order (social therapy). The ultimate end of all these devices is to ensure
social control. The warrior, then, must also be studied as social structure.
The extended family is the starting point of our analysis. It is not only the
beginning of the political community but also the foundation of society. The
African state is an organism growing out of the family; and the warrior, as we
saw, is part of that organism. Among the Kikuyu, for example, the individual
warrior is responsible to his Mbari or Nyomba (family group) through which he
is responsible to his Moherega (clan) as well as to his riika (age-set) . The activi-
ties of the warrior, his successes and failures, reflect on his Mbari and Moherega.
Since the Kikuyu practice is almost universal throughout Africa, it will be
superfluous to burden ourselves with further samples. It is the starting point of
the education of the warrior. Notions of nationalism and patriotism are learned
within the family group and extended to the wide society as we shall see. The
state, then, is the extended family writ large.
The age-set and the circumcision guild constitute another form of social control
which is crucial to our understanding of the African warrior especially in his
relationships with the state. It is a widely adopted method of unifying the com-
munity and of determining status and behaviour patterns. It is a means for
organising corporate alliances with the aim in view of not only achieving social
transformation but also of organising the state for offence and defence. Kikuyu,
once more, provides us with a good sample. Kenyatta writes: &dquo;the Mbari and
the Moherega system help to form several groups of kinsfolk within the tribe,
acting independently; but the system of the age-grading unites and solidifies
the whole tribe in all its activities.&dquo;45 Kikuyu warriors were grouped according
to their riika. Boys and girls became members of a riika by passing through the
rite known as gotonya ndogera na mato (piercing of the ears) . This was done be-
tween the ages of four and five. Then, between the ages of eighteen and twenty
they undergo circumcision ceremonies. To become a warrior one must have
performed these rites. The Kehee (uncircumcised person) was regarded as a
coward, a social undesirable. According to Kenyatta:
He cannot build a homestead of his own. In the days of tribal war he could not go to the
battlefield; he could only stay at home with the women and defend the homestead. He
cannot boast or brag or even appear to do so. He is not allowed to wear the long hair of
the mwanake, circumcised youth; it is taboo for him to have sexual intercourse with
circumcised girls. In meat feasts, he is not allowed to eat certain joints; he cannot have a
circumcised man as an intimate friend. In contrast with all this, the circumcised youth
is a warrior, a dandy, a dancer, an eater of good food. He is full-grown, a proper man, a
full member of the tribe.46
In short, a coward in a society such as this is, for all practical purposes, a
non-person beneath the law. A circumcised Kikuyu, on the other hand, was
regarded as a brave man and was called a mondomorome (a he-man) ; he was ad-
45 Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, p. 4.
46 Ibid., p. 104.
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mitted to the njamaya anake a mumo (the national council of junior warriors) and
introduced &dquo;into the general activities and etiquette of the warrior class&dquo;. After
this introduction, the leading warrior utters the rohio (a war cry) and the young
warrior joins his companies in making the following nar.oehetzva zua anake (war-
riors’ resolution) :
We brandish our spears, which is the symbol of our courageous and fighting spirit, never
to retreat or abandon our hope, or run away from our comrades. If ever we shall make a
decision, nothing will change us; and even if the heaven should hold over us a threat to
fall and crush us, we shall take our spears and prop it. And if there seems to be a unity
between the heaven and the earth to destroy us, we shall sink the bottom part of our
spear on the earth, preventing them from uniting; thus keeping the two entities, the
earth and the sky, though together, apart. Our faith and our decision never changing
shall act as balance.4?
The young warrior then is allowed to demonstrate his skill in a mock
battle. He has to wait, however, for &dquo;about eighty-two moons or twelve rainy
seasons following the circumcision ceremony&dquo; for promotion to the rank of
njama j>a ita (council of senior warriors).48 At this point his formal education is
over and he assumes the political and social positions for which he has been
training since the age of four or five.
The social philosophy behind age-sets and circumcision rites is fascinating.
A few more samples, therefore, will be worthwhile. The Tiriki of Kenya, too,
had, for the sake of corporate unity, defence and offence, divided their male
population into seven age-sets. They also practised circumcision which gave
a ritual embodiment to the passage from boyhood to manhood. During
the period of seclusion, lasting some six months, period the youth went
through a carefully laid out programme to bring about social transformation.
Communal undertakings were encouraged; individualism was discouraged. It
took the young Tiriki some fifteen years, however, after the initiation ceremony
before he was admitted to the rank of the warriors, the most admired honour
for men in that society. Before attaining this honour, he must have demon-
strated qualities of leadership, charisma, and prowess in conflict. By the age of
forty he would be elevated to the status of elder warriors. At this point his
formal education would be completed. It was these elder warriors, we are told,
who actually ruled Tirikiland.49 Among the Tiriki, therefore, the warriors
formed an elite set, a sort of military aristocracy, the elderly among whom con-
trolled political power. As in Kikuyu, Tirikiland institutionalized and vigorous-
ly cultivated the warrior tradition. The warrior-politician manipulated Tiriki
society to ensure its survival and thereby protected their position.
In Uganda the Bagisu are well known for the organisation of their society
by age-sets through a ritual circumcision of boys and girls, very much in the
47 Ibid., p. 191.
48 Ibid., p. 192.
49 Basil Davidson, The African Genius: An Introduction to African Social and Cultural History
(Boston: 1969), pp. 84-86.
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tradition of the Kikuyu, unlike whom, however, such a practice did not appear
to have had much military significance. Of course, the Bagisu fought wars - or
more likely battles - when the occasion demanded such a solution. But such
occasions appear to have been very rare, and when they did occur, the wars or
battles were of short duration.b° The warrior tradition among the Bagisu was
therefore weak. For the interlacustrine Bantu, on the other hand, where ritual
circumcision was not practised and where variations of a centralized form of
government were operated, the warrior tradition had more social significance.
The ruling aristocracy of the conquest state of Banyankore, for example - the
Bahima - dominated the more numerous Bairu until the colonial period, due, in
part, to greater military cohesion and prowess in war. Through the existence of
warrior bands, led by certain military chiefs who recognised the Omugabe
(king) of Nkore as their sovereign, the Bahima aristocracy perpetuated the
social domination of the Bairu. Marriage between a Mwiru and a Mukima was
strictly prohibited, and the illegitimate offsprings between Bahima men and
Bairu girls were legally classed as Bairu although they were called Abambari
(half-castes). Their lot, however, as was usual in similar cases in other parts of
the world, was better than that of the Bairu. A Mwiru was forbidden to kill a
Muhima for any reason whatsoever while the same rule did not apply to a
Muhima. The Bairu were forbidden to own &dquo;productive cows&dquo;; but they were
ruthlessly exploited through the imposition of food and labour tribute.51 The
military in Nkore was an instrument of class and social domination in pre-
colonial Uganda.
Before the Mfecane, the Nguni regarded the age-set rite and ritual circum-
cision as a sacred institution. The Nguni age-set organisation or circumcision
guild differed, however, from the others we have discussed so far in one im-
portant respect: each age-set was associated with a royal age-mate who led his
peers in war and peace. But the principles of the institution as well as the con-
comitant rite of circumsision was similar. 52 During the Mfecane, as we shall see,
the age-regiment replaced the age-set; circumcision was abandoned, and
society took a more military character.
The age-set organisation appears to have been better developed - in terms
of its structural-functional significance - in eastern African and Bantu southern
African societies than in those of West-Africa. Circumcision, for example,
among the Igbo or among West African Muslim communities has no discernible
military or age-set connotation since it was carried out within the first two weeks
of a child’s birth. The age-set organization existed to perform several social
functions, the military aspects of which, though important, were not particular-
ly pronounced. Among the Yoruba, on the other hand, the lineage and age-
set systems did provide, to some degree, the social machinery for defence and
50 John Roscoe, The Northern Bantu (London: 1915 and 1966), p. 190.
51 K. Oberg, "The Kingdom of Ankole in Uganda," in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard,
African Political Systems, pp. 121-136.
52 Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, pp. 27-28.
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offence within the various state systems. Members of a lineage lived in an
Agbo-Ile (compound) under the leadership of a lineage head, usually the eldest
member of the lineage. The age-sets were formed from several lineages to per-
form social functions similar to those performed by Kikuyu age-sets. In war-
time, the age-sets were led by the Elegbe chiefs. As a result of the nineteenth
century civil wars, the warriors came to assume greater social significance. The
age-set, as a machinery for achieving social cohesion, joint identity, common
heritage and common future, broke down. Ibadan led the way in this trans-
formation. Here, the civil war had given rise to prominent warriors who
headed their own armies. It is true that the nucleus of each war leader’s army
still came from his own lineage or village, but as the civil war progressed, the
ranks of this army were swollen by the process of accretion. The new additions
included war captives as well as free men from various parts of Yorubaland
(especially refugees), &dquo;who, eager to share in the greatness [of the warlord]&dquo; as
well as in his successes and in his protection, &dquo;willingly attached themselves to
him.&dquo; They were settled in an Agbo-Ile belonging to the warlord. In a sense,
then, an Ibadan army did not exist; there existed only a band of warriors &dquo;each
owned, led, and provided for by its chief.&dquo;53 It would appear that a client -
captive or free - after making a name for himself in this sort of military activity,
would return to his own home and raise his own personal army in the tradition
of his former Ibadan overlord. In this way, what has been described as the
&dquo;Ibadan System&dquo; gradually spread throughout Yorubaland during the nine-
teenth century. These warlords forced their followers to cultivate large farms
for the purpose of producing food for sale, to engage in trade in order to raise
revenue, including the distribution of imported goods. Nineteenth century
Yoruba history is full of examples of outstanding warlords whose versatility,
ambition, greed and restlessness made war a permanent necessity. War became
a necessity for a warlord not only for the purpose of keeping his warriors con-
stantly occupied but also for increasing his following (since a large, well trained
and well led following ensured survival in this dangerous and highly competi-
tive age); it was essential for the purchase of arms and ammunition to be used
in the execution of further wars. Success bred success; failure meant death or
enslavement. The rise of the warlords altered social relationships in Yoruba
country by successfully challenging the social and political dominance of the
traditional rulers who were now their puppets. But it also resulted in the loss of
personal freedoms among ordinary citizens who, in search of security and liveli-
hood following the breakdown of law and order, sought the protection of
powerful individuals. It was the British conquest of Yorubaland which brought
to an end the era of the great warlords in Yoruba History. 54
The age-set organisation does not appear to have existed among the Akan
of Ghana. However, the asafo (military organisation of the towns) and the
abusua (clan system) seem to have performed a similar function. &dquo;Every Agona
53 Akintoye, "Military Among the Yoruba," loc. cit.
54 Ibid.
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(and for that matter every Akan)&dquo;, writes Maxwell Owusu, &dquo;belongs to some
asafo on the father’s side (patrilineally) as he or she belongs to an abusua on the
mother’s side (matrilineally) .&dquo;55 The asafo, nevertheless, seems to have been
most developed among the Fante. It comprised both men and women but only
the men engaged in its military activities. The asafo is a social and military
institution through which individuals who proved themselves in battle were
rewarded with honours including chieftainships.56 It was aimed not only at
demonstrating common identity but also at ensuring the stability, survival, and
power of the Akan states, thereby promising a common and bright future. We
shall return to the asafo presently.
Suffice it to say, in summary, that the asafo, as a social control system, per-
formed similar functions as the age-set, the age-regiment, and the circumcision
guild. All these systems are significant as instruments of primodial nationalism
and patriotism, social transformation, and social therapy. In short, we are deal-
ing with social manipulation at its best. And, in the final analysis, society is
broadly manipulated for offence and defence.
The Organisational Dimension
Most studies of the precolonial African military are concerned with the
military organisation of individual state systems. These studies, provided main-
ly by anthropologists, are usually sketchy and largely descriptive. Few compari-
sons are attempted. In a recent sampling of precolonial African military sys-
tems, however, Claude Welch, noted in an otherwise useful study, what he saw
as &dquo;the extraordinary variations in African military organisation.&dquo;57 I think
this is a gross exaggeration. Varieties certainly there were; but there was
nothing extraordinary or dramatic about them. If our contention is correct,
namely, that African military organisation followed closely the organisation of
the state, and if this state organisation can be broadly classified - as is usually
the case - into centralised, semi-centralised (semi-segmentary), and non-
centralised (segmentary), military organisation ought therefore to reflect these
three broad distinctions. And even if we added to these three categories Aidan
Southall’s intriguing as well as baffling notion of &dquo;segmentary kingdoms&dquo;, we
can hardly assert that precolonial African military organisations are myriad.
On the contrary, similarities in organisation are more common than dissimilar-
ities. In this section our sampling will be more extensive than hitherto and,
inevitably, less detailed. The organisational dimension of the African military
may be studied under the following aspects: Leadership and Command
Hierarchy; Recruitment and Mobilisation; Technology, Training and Tactics.
55 M. Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case Study of Continuity and Change in the
Politics of Ghana (Chicago: 1970), p. 41.
56 For a study of the Asafo system see Ansu K. Datta and R. Potter, "The Asafo System in
Historical Perspective," J.A.H., XII, 2 (1971).
57 C. Welch, "Continuity and Discontinuity in African Military Organisation," J.M.A.S.,
13, 2 (1975), p. 235.
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Leadership and Command Hierarchy. Leadership in war, even when it resided
in the dominant group within the state system, on heredity, or is clan based, was
generally entrusted to the most capable hand among the privileged. It is, in-
deed, part of the command hierarchy which follows closely the state organisa-
tion. Among the so-called egalitarian Igbo, for example, leadership in war was
not hereditary. It was earned on merit, that is, proven ability in battles, in-
cluding demonstrable excellence in the mastery of the martial arts. 58 I have no
information, however, to suggest that an Osu (untouchable?) or Ohu (slave?)
was ever made the generalissimo. They did fight with the rank and file citizens
and were rewarded according to their merit. The essential point here is that
leadership in war is a function of the Igbo political organisation. But the issue
of ability and excellence among the privileged as the prerequisite for leader-
ship is also true of the Kikuyu Acholi, Bunyoro Kitara, Buganda, Nkore, Zulu,
Ndebele, Rwanda, Akan, Oyo, Tukulor and so many others. The morality of
dividing society between privileged and unprivileged classes is not here my
concern. The point I wish to stress, however, is the similarity of the leadership
ideology within states of differing political organisation.
In Bunyoro Kitara, the Omukama was the commander-in-chief of his war-
riors, and the territorial administrators, as we saw, comprised what might be
called the officer class. Together they led the citizen militia in war and ruled
them in peace. When, as a result of widening responsibilities and internal
problems he was forced to surrender field command to his military chiefs, his
political effectiveness declined; and by the middle of the nineteenth century,
the great Kitara empire had become a shadow of its former self. Kabalega’s
creation of the abarusura, as we also saw, was intended to check the dominant
influence of these military chiefs. This policy naturally involved a change in
command hierarchy. All the commanders, for example - with the exception of
three59 (whose loyalty was not in doubt) - were no longer territorial rulers;
equally importantly, every commander could be transferred from one command to
another which meant that the command was no longer, as in the past, a sort of
territorial fief. The generalissimo, too, was no longer necessarily the most im-
portant and able territorial ruler. Military command and territorial rulership,
in short, had become separable. In Bunyoro, at any rate, change in military
organisation affected decisively power relationships within the state. 60
This is also true of the Zulu and the Ndebele. The barrack system which
Kabalega developed in the second half of the nineteenth century, had earlier
been developed by Shaka. I have no reason to believe that Kabalega copied
58 S. C. Ukpabi, "The Military in Pre-Colonial Igboland," The Accra Conference, August,
1975.
59 These were Nyakatura Nyakamatura, Ireeta Byangombe, and Kikukuule Runego. These
important personalities had helped put Kabalega on the throne during the succession
war of 1869-1871. He therefore rewarded them by appointing them abarusura generals
while allowing them to retain their chiefly responsibilities as well.
60 Uzoigwe, Revolution and Revolt, pp. 1-29; idem, "Kabalega and the Making of a New
Kitara," pp. 5-20.
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this system from Shaka. But the introduction of the barrack system in Zululand
also changed power relationships, especially command hierarchy. During the
Mfecane, and as a result of increasing military insecurity, the Mthethwa (under
Dingiswayo), the Ndwandwe (under Zwide), the Ngwane (under Sobhuza),
and the Pondo were forced to abandon the sacred rite of circumcision whose
ritual seclusion tied up a significant flighting force in times of crises, and changed
the age-sets into age-regiments. It was Shaka, however, who perfected the age-
regimental organisation. The regiments, unlike those we have studied so far,
were not grouped according to clan ties. They were, on the contrary, trans-
ethnic and &dquo;national&dquo; in composition. They were forbidden to marry until they
reached the age of between thirty-five and forty years at which period they
were permitted to marry from a regiment of girls of between twenty-three and
twenty-five years of age. Both the regiment of boys and the regiment of girls as
well as royal Zulu women were housed in barracks. These innovations, in ad-
dition to the military tactics developed by Shaka, were the most important
contributions he made to the social history of the southern Bantu. The great
Mzilikazi Kumalo, king of the Ndebele, conqueror of the Shona, and founder
of what later came to be called Rhodesia instead of Mzilikazia (Zimbabwe), did
not establish the barrack system (within which he was schooled) in his new
kingdom. Nor, indeed, did he enforce celibacy for himself or his warriors. But,
then, his problems were different from Shaka’s; on the contrary, he used his
regiments as an army of occupations. 61 Barrack existence and celibacy were seen
by Shaka as a conditio sine qua non for military discipline. It is remarkable that
these soldiers did not practise homosexuality. Everyone, except the diviners or
the infirm, belonged to a regiment.62 The Zulu were definitely a &dquo;nation in
arms&dquo;. The Zulu state was a timarchy, the like of which Africa had not seen
before and probably would not see again. The territorial chiefs of earlier days
were no longer significant in the new scheme of things. By the second half of the
nineteenth century when the Zulu military machine reached its perfection, it
seems reasonable to assume that the territorial chiefships were occupied by
retired warriors.
Command hierarchy among the Ndebele was an elaborate administrative
system. Matabeleland consisted of four imikhono (saza in Runyoro; provinces
or countries in English) which also coincided with the four divisions of Nlzilika-
zi’s army. Each imikhono was administered by an induna Nkulu (senior chief);
it was also divided into districts which, except for those under the control of the
chiefs of the conquered and assimilated Shona, coincided with the impi (regi-
ments) of the army. There was also the buto (military regimental town) which
was under the control of the induna yabuto (commanding general) . But there
were usually also, in each buto, an induna Umuzi who was in charge of civilian
61 Gluckman, "The Individual in a Social Framework," loc. cit., p. 139.
62 E. J. Krige, "The Military Organisation of the Zulus," in Elliot P. Skinner (ed.), Peoples
and Cultures of Africa (New York: 1973), p. 484; cf. James Stuart, History of the Zulu Rebel-
lion 1906 (London: 1913), esp. p. 72.
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as opposed to military matters. Below both indunas were the abalisa (battalion
commanders); and above the indunas was the Nkosi (king) himself.63 The
structure of Matabeleland was, like that of Zululand out of which it grew, sim-
ply the structure of an army. In war and peace, the Nkosi, like the Omukama
of Bunyoro or the Kabaka of Buganda, was a centrifugal as well as a centripetal
force in the kingdom. But neither Bunyoro nor Buganda was militarized to the
extent that Matabeleland was.
Among the Akans command hierarchy also followed the state administra-
tive pattern. Maxwell Owusu, writing about Agona states: &dquo;The organisation
of stools and swords in Agona is nothing but military formation based on the
logistics of war developed by the people. Political organization is ipso facto
military organization.&dquo; 64 This statement may well apply to all the Akan states
generally. Among the Asante, for example, the members of the oman nhyiama
(ruling state council), for example, also headed the military divisions of the
state. The Asantehene (king) held the position of supreme commander of the
army; two of his deputies who administered the state in his absence, the Konti-
hene and the Akwamuhene, were also the first and second war chiefs respective-
ly. Below them were the Adontenhene (commander of the main force - &dquo;the
carrier of the foot of the Omanhene&dquo;); Nifahene (right wing); Benkumehene
(left wing); Kyidomhene (rearguard); and Gyaesehene (Omanhene’s body-
guard as well as the head of the domestic bureaucracy). Here, once again, is a
dangerous fusion of military and political functions. These leaders, too, except
in a few cases, were also either lineage heads or chiefs of provinces. In peace-
time, they managed the state apparata; in wartime, they took all decisions
including the prosecution of the war itself as well as the making of peace.65
These samples will suffice to show that the command hierarchy in the kingdom
states of Africa reflected the political organisation of the states. Minor varia-
tions occurred here and there, but there was really nothing dramatic about
these variations.
Igboland, on the other hand, which included both the characteristics of the
semi-kingdom and non-kingdom state systems, does vary from the classic king-
dom states but only because of the varying political structure. Among those
uninfluenced by kingdom characteristics, the war commander was usually ap-
pointed by the consensus of the warriors prior to their departure for the battle-
field. The commander, called Ochiagha (leader in war), was always someone
whose warrior reputation was already secure; but during his tenure he must
continuously live up to that reputation or yield his place to a more deserving
comrade. The Ochiagha commanded the centre in battle. He was assisted by
two other commanders, also appointed by consensus because of proven ability,
63 David Chanaiwa, "The Army and Politics in Pre-Industrial Africa: Ndebele Nation
1822-1893," Accra Conference, August, 1975.
64 Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power, p. 39.
65 Agnes A. Aidoo, "The Role of the Military in Politics and Society in 19th Century
Asante," Accra Conference, August, 1975; Kwame Arhim, "Asante Militarism: A Prelim-
inary Note," Accra Conference, August, 1975; cf. Owusu, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
43
who commanded the right and left flanks respectively.66 The Ochiagha was
responsible to no one but to his village or town. Among Onitsha, Oguta and
Aboh Igbo - areas influenced by kingdom characteristics - there was also
always a commander-in-chief called the Iyase. But he wielded no more
authority than the Ochiagha.67 Like the Igbo Council of Elders, the Acholi
rivot (lord or clan leader) and his counsellors and other advisers were not
military men per se. They concerned themselves with civil matters although they
decided when to go to war and when to make peace. But the general was chosen
in peacetime by censensus. He had a free hand in the prosecution of war. The
civilians, however, made decisions regarding the spoils of war.68 The Acholi,
like the Igbo, believed in specialisation and division of labour.
Recruitment and Mobilisation. Except in a few cases, and mostly during the
nineteenth century, African warriors were assembled ad hoc to deal with specific
emergencies or to execute certain state objectives. They were agriculturists,
pastoralists, artisans, administrators, etc. who reverted unobtrusively to their
occupations as seen as the campaigns were over. In short, every able-bodied
male of military age was a soldier in addition to his other occupations. In some
societies, Igbo69 and Dahomery, for example, females participated in the fight-
ing but there was no general mobilisation among them; in most societies, how-
ever, women contributed indirectly but significantly to the war effort. There
were, of course, certain states - usually conquest states - which adopted the
principle of differential recruitment by linking class with military specialisa-
tion. This was true of the Mossi where only the noblemen served in the cavalry
and commoners served as infantrymen; and in major battles, infantry was only
auxiliary to cavalry. But yet all able-bodied males of military age went to war.
It has also been noted among the Hausa, slaves dominated the infantry and
formed a considerable part of the cavalry as well. Here, therefore, differential
recruitment was mitigated somewhat. For the Wolof in the nineteenth century
the bulk of the warriors were thiedos (unbelievers) who served under the com-
mand of village chiefs.70 The pattern of social dominance was such, however,
that the thiedos could not overthrow the theocratic state system. In Rwanda, the
reverse was the case. The dominant Batutsi (pastoralists) used differential
recruitment as one of the means of perpetuating their dominance over the
Bahutu (agriculturists). And although by the nineteenth century certain
Bahutu such as Bisangwa and Bishingwe rose to be military commanders, the
66 Ukpabi, "The Military in Pre-Colonial Igboland", loc. cit.
67 Ibid.
68 John O. Dwyer, "Acholi Military History", African Studies Association Conference
paper, Philadelphia, 10 November 1972.
69 The role of Dahomeian women in war is well known. For Igbo women see Paul Edwards,
Equiano’s Travels (London: 1967), pp. 9-10.
70 Welch, "Continuity and Discontinuity in African Military Organisation", pp. 232-233;
cf. Elliot P. Skinner, The Mossi of the Upper Volta : The Political Development of a Sudanese
People (Stanford: 1964), pp. 97-106; M. G. Smith, The Economy of Hausa Communities of
Zaira (London: 1955), p. 10.
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fact remained that the Bahutu did not generally form part of the state itero
(military units). The Batwa (pigmies), too, could only serve as the Mwami’s
(king’s) personal bodyguards, as bodyguards of important chiefs, and as war-
riors outside the itero organisation. We have also noted that in those societies
where military service depended on circumcision and age-sets, individuals who
failed to perform these necessary rites de passage were also affected by differential
recruitment. In terms, however, of the generality of African state systems, re-
cruitment and mobilisation patterns were more simular than dissimilar. Among
the states which developed standing armies, ability, loyalty, and bravery rather
than class differentiation seems to have determined a warrior’s future in the
military hierarchy. Indeed, Shaka or Kabalega would go out of his way to hunt
down and kill a disloyal warrior or one who was convicted of cowardice; they
would also reward generously a loyal and outstanding warrior irrespective of
his class.
Technology, Training and Tactics. The impact of technological innovation on
the histories of nations cannot be overemphasized; but it is also apt to be mis-
understood. Superior military technology is not only an instrument of imperial
domination but also one of internal coersion. More importantly, it is an in-
strument controlled by the ruling elite. Where centralised control is impossible
as in the case of the &dquo;democratic&dquo; bow and arrow, the state manipulates its use
through specific acts of social and political engineering. But since the ruling
elite of precolonial African states comprised also the warriors, it means that
precolonial African history was characterised by a dangerous fusion of politics
and violence. In both the colonial and postcolonial periods of African history,
such a trend has continued unabated. A colonial situation was created by
violence and maintained by violence or the threat of it - whatever the apologists
of colonialism may say. Independent African states - and I am really hard put
to make an exception here - even where the military is not exercising open
power, have tended to show less restraint in the use of violence to ensure in-
dividual, particularist, ethnic, or state ends. The warrior, then the soldier, has
become more and more, not the instrument of defence and offence, but an in-
strument of coercion. Indeed, I think it is fair to say that precolonial African
states, in spite of their dangerous fusion of politics and the military, in general
used less physical coercion than the colonial and postcolonial states; but they
were more adept at politico-socio manupilation than their twentieth century
successor states.
What is easily noticeable about precolonial African military technology
is its simplicity. For our immediate purposes, however, what is intriguing is the
similarity of the military technology of these African state systems as shown
below:
71 Welch, "Continuity and Discontinuity," pp. 233-234; cf. J. J. P. Maquet, The Premise of




Acholi Shield, spear, knife
Buganda Shield, throwing spear, stabbing spear, fircarms (19th century)
Bugisu Shield, spear, knifc
Bunyoro Kitara Shield, throwing spear, stabbing spear, bow and arrow (used only
by the fishing community of Bugungu), firearms (19th century)
Hausa Shield, horse, sword, bow and arrow, firearms
Igbo Shield, spear, bow and arrow, dagger, spiked club, matchets, steel
knife, firearms
Ndebele Shield, throwing assegai (spear), stabbing spear, firearms (19th
century)
Tukulor Shield, horse, sword, firearms
Yoruba Shield, spear, bow and arrow, sword, horse, firearms
Zulu Shield, throwing assegai (spear), stabbing assegai, firearms (19th
century)
From the above sampling carefully selected to reflect ecological, regional,
and constitutional variables, we may arrive at the following conclusions. First,
precolonial African military technology was very rudimentary and shows more
similarities than dissimilarities. Shields and missiles provide the common de-
nominator. Second, it follows therefore that in either offensive or defensive war,
training, tactics, cohesion, leadership, discipline, martial spirit, numbers, and
geography, in varying ways, would seem to be more crucial than technology.
Hausa horsemen, for example, fighting in the forest areas of Igboland, would
not have a ghost of a chance. Nor would Igbo warriors fare any better in the
grassland against the Hausa. Third, firearms were fairly well spread, at any
rate, by the nineteenth century. But their use by no means discouraged the use
of other weapons. Indeed, my studies in East Africa demonstrate that the im-
pact of firearms on the outcome of battles has been exaggerated. Nor did fire-
arms necessarily prove a worse instrument of coercion in the period under
survey than the other military technologies. Shaka’s Zulu, we know, did not
use firearms; and yet his Zulu state was the most coercive state in nineteenth
century Africa. And fourth, the crucial point to note in any discussion of the
warriors and the state is not only the novelty of the technology available to the
state but also - and more importantly - who controlled what technology there
was, how effectively it was controlled, and to what end.
In this consideration the nature of the socio-political structure of the states,
as we have shown, becomes crucial. Religion, not firearms,72 led to the rise of
bureaucratic states in the central Sudan during the nineteenth century; and it
was the quality of Shaka’s military leadership and military tactics that proved
more crucial as centralising modes than the mere introduction of the assegai.
Indeed, the assegai, as a technological innovation, cannot be attributed to
Shaka. It was a weapon with which the Zulu were already familiar. Shaka’s
72 Joseph P. Smaldone seems to argue the contrary. See "Firearms in the Central Sudan:
A Revaluation", J.A.H., XIII, 4 (1972); cf. idem, "Military Organisation, Warfare, and
Sudanic State Structure: Some Sociological Aspects of Technological Change," African
Studies Assocation Conference paper, Philadelphia, 10 November 1972.
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great military contribution, therefore, was in the areas of tactics and training.
Even under Shaka, a warrior carried both his throwing spear and his stabbing
spear. The stabbing spear, as we saw, was also familiar to the Baganda and
Banyoro. And yet East African historians have not made much noise about its
existence. The reason, I suppose, is because the East African warriors
were unable to put it into the revolutionary use to the extent that
Shaka did. The difference between, say, Zwide’s warriors and those of Shaka
was that the latter were better trained, better disciplined, and better led. The
standing army created by Shaka was also a tactical innovation designed to
ensure discipline and the enhancement of his power which were crucial for
empire-building. In Bunyoro, Kabalega who bears comparison with Shaka in
several respects, was nonetheless not a military genius; but he was a great
warrior who realised, as did Shaka, that the army was the instrument to main-
tain state, and consequently, royal power. His formation of the abarusura was a
significant military development in the interlacustrine region. It was a tactical
contribution designed to subdue overmighty subjects, pick up the pieces of the
practically disintegrated Kitara empire, check the prospering ambition of
Buganda, and if possible, recreate the old Kitara empire. Finally, it is in the
area of systematic, sustained military training that precolonial African warriors
were least deficient. Technological innovation, unsupported by adequate
training and tactics, loses its effectiveness.
Conclusions
This chapter is a contribution to the study of the precolonial African
military as an indispensable aspect of African history. The images of the warrior
are not its theme. On the contrary, it is a comparative study of the institutional-
functional aspects of defence and offence among carefully selected precolonial
African state systems. It aspires, however, to be no more than an introduction -
a prospectus, if you will - to a field of research that promises a bright future
ahead of it. The information at my disposal, nevertheless, has led to certain
conclusions which further, more systematic, researches may well modify or even
confirm; first, that the study of the precolonial African military is the study of
the structure of African history itself. Therefore, a military interpretation of
African history should prove as rewarding - or even more rewarding - than the
prevailing interpretations. Second, the African warrior was a political animal
par excellence particularly because of the fusion of the state and the military. The
study of the warrior, then, is tantamount to the study of the state. And since the
Africans saw the state as organism, the warrior, too, must be studied as organ-
ism. The ambitious youth was well aware that excellence as a warrior was an
impeccable passport to important political offices, wealth, glory, honour, them-
selves part of the equation. The warrior tradition was the bedrock of state-
hood ; and politics, in short, was organised around the warriors. Politics, law,
and the instruments of destruction resided in the same hands. Prima facie, this
was an unhealthy development especially as the warrior was dominant in both
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national and territorial administration. The ordinary citizens had no means of
overthrowing unpopular military-civilian governments in the kingdom states.
Palace rebellions, sometimes leading to changes in personnel, did, of course,
occur from time to time; but the structure of government hardly changed. The
rise of standing armies and professional warriors in the nineteenth century did,
indeed, upset the political balance; but politics remained structured in such a
way that the people could still not change an oppressive government. Neverthe-
less, few governments were ever as oppressive as the colonial or the post-
colonial governments. Among non-kingdom states such as the Kikuyu and the
Igbo, the myth that the ordinary citizen was an indivisible element of govern-
ment was so astutely cultivated that the overthrow of those who controlled
power was considered unnecessary. This brings us to our third conclusion,
namely, that the warrior was, first and last, a citizen. His education was a
brilliant lesson in social manipulation and social control. The sacred notion of
the extended family, the rites des passage of age-sets and circumcision guilds, and
age-regiments (whether they be of the variety perfected by the Zulu or the
asafo of the Akans) were all intended to inculcate the idea of nationalism and
patriotism, to achieve social transformation, and to act as social therapy. In the
final analysis, the philosophy behind these social institutions is a broad manipu-
lation of society for offence and defence in the interests of stability, survival,
and prosperity of the state. Fourth, since the organisation of the military fol-
lowed closely the organisation of the state, and since the organisation of African
state systems are reducible to three broad categories, the dramatic variations
that are supposed to characterize precolonial African military organisations are
fictitious. Within the broad categories differences did exist, but there was
nothing extraordinary about them. On the contrary, the precolonial African
military organisation - and indeed the military in general - exhibits more
similarities than dissimilarities. And fifth, to understand fully the military in
contemporary Africa, the character and nature of the military in precolonial
Africa must first be comprehended. It is only then that the question of continu-
ities and discontinuities in the African military tradition which is now attract-
ing some attention can be more fruitfully tackled. It is hoped that this study has
made a small contribution - in spite of its weaknesses - in that direction.
